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CALIFORNIA CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE
William A. Riordan*
California's Business and Professions Code, Section 16600, provides gen-
erally that "Every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging 
in
a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void, ex-
cept as provided in this chapter."
Certain exceptions are specified in Sections 16601 and 16602, enacted as
part of the Code in 1941. the year in which similar provisions were repealed
from the Civil Code., In effect they prescribe what will be allowed as a rea-
sonable contractual restraint of trade and preclude the California courts from
applying the "Rule of Reason" by which the legality of similar transactions
is tested in cases under the federal Sherman Act.
2
The present Section 16601 of the Business and Professions Code makes
valid certain agreements not to compete, incident to the sale of the good will
of a business or of all the stock of a corportation. Where the contract for
the sale of the business contains no restrictions on the seller's right to carry
on the same line of business, however, no agreement not to compete will
be implied by the courts, nor can its existence be established by oral proof.
a
a. UPON THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
The sale of the business must include the seller's interest in the good 
will
or no incidental restraint, however express, will be enforced. In Haas 
v.
Hodge,4 a doctor's promise not to practice within a given area upon the ter-
mination of an association was held invalid where the agreement closely re-
sembled an employment contract and the defendant had renounced any interest
in the association's professional practice. It was determined that Section 16601
did not apply since the defendant had no interest in the good will of 
the
practice to sell to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the defendant had not and could
not have sold any good will acquired by his personal skill.
In Kaplan v. Nalpak Corporation.
5 a seller's agreement to refrain from
competition in all cities and counties in which the business was carried on
within the state was upheld as valid under Section 16601. The former 
Civil
Code Section 1674 specifically limited the area of such agreements to a
"county, city or part thereof." When the present Section 16601 was enacted
in the Business and Professions Code. however, the wording was changed to
".a specified county or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, in which the
business . ; . has been carried on." (Emphasis added.) In light-of the policy
to protect a purchaser within reasonable limits in the enjoyment of the good
will which he has purchased, the court held that the seller's agreement could
validly extend to include all those counties in which there were customers to
whom the business made sales in substantial amounts.
And in Dillion v. Summer,6 a doctor had orally promised, pursuant to 
the
sale of his medical practice, not to engage in the practice of medicine, 
ex-
Third year student. University of Santa Cl-irai School of Law.
1. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1674, 1675.
2. 26 U.S. Stat. 209 (1890).
The leading case setting forth the "Rule of Reason" is Standard Oil Company 
of New
Jersey v. United States. 221 U.S. 1. 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1910).
3. Kaye v. Tellsen. 129 Cal. App. 2d 115 (1955).
4. 171 Cal. App. 2d 478 (1959).
5. 158 Cal. App. 2d 197 (1958).
6. 153 Cal. App. 2d (1957).
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pressing no limitations with respect to the territory included. His promise
was enforceable to the extent of the area allowed under Section 16601, which
included the cities and counties in which the practice had been carried on.
The language of Section 16600, to the effect that a contract would be de-
clared invalid to the extent that it was an illegal restraint may have been
persuasive.
b. UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF A PARTNERSHIP
Section 16602 excepts certain similar agreements not to compete upon the
dissolution of a partnership. Comparatively restricted territorial limits are im-
posed, however, upon such agreements. An agreement pursuant to the sale
of a partnership interest in which the seller promised not to engage in the
same type of business in any county in which the partnership had conducted:
its business was held unenforceable in the recent case of Anderson Crop
Dusters, Inc. v. Mately.7 An injunction against the seller who was competing
in the crop-dusting business in the same county in which the partnership had
its place of business was denied. In this situation, the present Section 16602
of the Business and Professions Code is a verbatim re-enactment of its pre-
decessor. Section 1675 of the Civil Code which was repealed in 1941:
Partners may, upon or in anticipation of dissolution of a partner-
ship, agree that none of them will carry on a similar business within the
same city or town or a specified part thereof. (Emphasis added.)
The early case of Du Bois v. Padgham8 had construed the statute to mean
the city or town in which the partnership had its principal place of business.
not any town in which a substantial amount of business was carried on, al
the defendant there contended. Although the court in the Anderson Crop
Dusters case cast some doubts upon the aptness of that construction, it held
that since the legislature in 1941 re-enacted the provision after it had been
so interpreted, the court was not free to disturb that interpretation.
In the Haas case, the defendant had set up an office only five miles from
the plaintiff's office, but across the city line. If there had been a partnership
relation between the parties, would this distance be beyond the enforceable
limits of an agreement not to compete upon dissolution of the partnership? It
would seem to be so, in light of the interpretation of Section 16602 followed
in the Anderson Crop Dusters case.
Such a result raises the question of whether a flexible "Rule of Reason';
would not be the more desirable measure of legality in each case, at least
with respect to allowable limitations of territory and duration. The principle
that primary consideration must be given in every case to the protection of
the public interest is urged in support of the fixed legislative standard. The
contention is persuasive where the standard is applicable to a relatively for-
seeable field of conduct. The desirability of such a standard is diminished.
however, where the transactions within its scope become so diverse that for-
seeability becomes a practical impossibility: At this point it is physically pos-,
sible for the courts alone to balance the relative merits of each case in light
of the expressed legislative policy. Without a flexible rule of reasonableness
there is a possibility that a preconceived legislative fiat may invalidate aqree-
ments which under the circumstances may in fact be reasonable and entirely
compatible with the primary public interest.
7. 159 Cal. App. 2d 811 (1958).
8. 18 Cal. App. 298 (1912).
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C. OTHER RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION
While statutory enumeration of exceptions to the rule invalidating con-
tracts in restraint of trade would appear exclusive according to customary
rules of construction, the judicial recognition of certain other agreements not
to compete raises the inquiry whether additional exceptions will be counte-
nanced by the courts. These cases may be reconciled with the view that there
are no exceptions outside the statute on the theory that they do not fall within
its purview in the first place. Thus, a covenant restricting the business use
of property sold under a conditional sales contract was held valid in the case
of Fidelity Credit Assurance Co. v. Cosby.9 in which the court reasoned
that since seller could have withheld the sale completely, he could' also
make it conditional. The same result should obtain where such a covenant is
regarded as a limitation to the original grant, instead of a restriction super-
imposed upon an outright grant. Under the "bundle of rights" theory of prop-
erty ownership, the withholding of certain rights in the first instance could
not comfortably be classified as a "restraint" on trade, or upon the use of the
land. Similarly, it was decided in the case of Associated Oil Co. v. Myers
10
that a lessor could limit the lessee's business use of the leased premises. Such
agreements were held not to entail a restraint on trade within the meaning
of Section 1673 of the Civil Code, the substantially identical predecessor of
Section 16600 of the Business and Professions Code.
In Keating v. Preston1 1 the language of a lease was determined to fairly
evidence the intention of the parties that the lessee was to have the exclusive
right to operate a restaurant in a particular hotel building. The lessor was en-
joined from leasing another part of the building to a competing enterprise.
Viewing the agreement as beyond the pale of Section 1673, the court followed
the rule of Great Western Distillery Products Inc. v. John A. Wathen Dis-
tillery Co. 12.
Statutes are interpreted in the light of reason and common sense,
and it may be stated as a general rule that courts will not hold to be in
restraint of trade a contract between individuals, the main purpose and
effect of which are to promote and increase business in the line affected,
merely because its operations might possibly in some theoretical way in-
cidentally and indirectly restrict trade in such line.
There appears to emerge from such language a judicial "Rule of Reason"
which is applied to detemine the existence of a restraint on trade within the
meaning of the statute, rather than to inquire into its reasonableness once a
restraint can be made out.
d. UPON TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
Noticeably absent from the Business and Professions Code, is a sec-
tion which qives validity under any circumstances to contracts by an em-
ployee not to compete upon the termination of his employment. Thus in
Morris v. Harris.1. a covenant in an employment contract. which rendered
the employee liable for liquidated damages if he solicited or accepted a cer-
tain type of work from the employer's clients, was held void under Section
16600. It made no difference that this was only a partial restraint on the em-
9. 90 Cal. App. 22 (1928).
10. 217 Cal. 297 (1933).
II. 42 Cal. App. 2d 110 (1940).
12. 10 Cal. 2d 442 (1937).
13. 127 Cal. App. 2d 476 (1954).
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ployee's right to engage in a lawful business. Section 16600 makes no ex-
ception for contracts which create only partial restraints of trade.
There are certain agreements in employment contracts which, although
they restrict the means of competition which a former employee may use upon
termination of the employment, are not invalidated by Section 16600. The
case of Gordon v. Landau1 4 involved the validity of a covenant in an em-
ployment contract by which the defendant was engaged as a salesman of
merchandise to the employer's customers. He had agreed not to solicit busi-
ness from these customers for one year after termination of his present em-
ployment. The agreement was held to be valid and enforceable for the reason
that it did not prevent the defendant from engaging in a lawful business or
profession but only from using the employer's confidential lists to solicit
customers.
And it was held in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. u.
Dempster15 that Section 16600 does not invalidate provisions in an employ-
ment contract protecting trade secrets or a special trust. Apparently the right
to recover in these cases is fundamentally based upon the right to be pro-
tected from tortious conduct in the form of unfair competition or the viola-
tion of a confidential relationship. Provisions of this nature also fall within
the class of agreements which are held not to be restraints of trade or busi-
ness within the meaning of the Business and Professions Code.
14. 49 Cal. 2d 690 (1958).
15. 174 Cal. App. 2d 418 (1959).
